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Achieving Peace in Iraq Through Negotiations:




As a consequence of the United States' invasion of Iraq and the ouster of
Saddam Hussein's regime, the Iraqi government collapsed, and a power
struggle developed.1 Many Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iraq have become members
of militias, and most support denomination-based political parties.2 Sectarian
violence has at times led some to believe that the country was at civil war, or
that civil war was imminent.3 Since the three largest ethnic-religious groups
* The following note was written between December 2007 and April 2008. During
the writing process, the author attempted to update this note as current events developed.
Because this note was based on a perception of the events at the time of writing, however,
the author felt that it was inappropriate and ineffective to alter content to reflect
developments in Iraq after the original writing had been completed.
** J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, 2009; A.B.,
Brown University. I would like to thank my fiancee Heidi Beauregard for her passion,
guidance, and sincerity. Thanks also to Professor Ellen Deason, Professor Sarah Cole,
and Dean Joseph Stulberg. Last, I would like to thank my parents, Justin and Louise
Lavin, and my siblings KEL, EHL, BML, and SDL for the support and insight they have
provided.
I See The Iraq Crisis-Timeline Chronology of Modem Iraqi History, MIDEASTWEB,
http://www.mideastweb.org/iraqtimeline.htm (last visited June 2, 2009); see generally
MICHAEL R. GORDON & GEN. BERNARD E. TRAINOR, COBRA II: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQ (Vintage Books 2007) (2006).
2 See Noah Feldman, Power Struggle, Tribal Conflict or Religious War?, TIME, Feb.
26, 2006, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1167736,00.html (explaining that
when governments collapse, people look for security wherever they can get it, and,
typically, this is through finding some group or association that is capable of keeping the
person safe. Often ethnicity, race, or religion provides a basic bond that may be enough to
ensure loyalty amongst members of a militia or a political party. Other arguments provide
that, in addition, ethnic conflict, tribalism, class, and social status are also significant
factors in the instability and conflict in Iraq); see also David Gritten, Long Path to Iraq's
Sectarian Split, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/4750320.stm (last visited June 2, 2009).
3 Duncan Kennedy, Iraq: The Case for Losing, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 667, 669-70
(2006) (discussing population shifts and homogenizing of neighborhoods in Iraq and
stating that "[a] civil war between Sunni and Shia is already under way."); Ibrahim Al-
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tend to live in distinct parts of the country,4 some have advocated for a
partition as the only solution.5 The situation in Iraq since American
occupation has been very volatile,6 but in recent months, sectarian violence
has substantially decreased. 7 Many have argued that the decrease in violence
between and amongst different ethnicities in Iraq resulted from the American
military surge.8 Less attention, however, has been devoted to the actions of
Iraqi leaders-which may also have contributed to the reduction in violence.9
Marashi, The Dynamics of Iraq's Media: Ethno-Sectarian Violence, Political Islam,
Public Advocacy, and Globalization, 25 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 95, 97-98 (2007)
(discussing the bombing of the revered Shi'a Al-'Askariyya shrine in the city of Samarra,
sectarian killings, and the conflict over oil-rich city of Kirkuk between Arabs, Kurds, and
Turkmen); Aparisim Bobby Ghosh, An Eye for an Eye, TIME, Feb. 26, 2006, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1167741,00.html (quoting Isam al-
Rawi, a Baghdad University geology professor and Sunni politician responding to the
bombing of the mosque in Samarra by pronouncing "This is it. The Shi'ites are going to
go mad. This is the start of the civil war."); see also Feldman, supra note 2.
4 Most Shi'ite Arabs live in Southern Iraq, Sunni Arabs live in Central Iraq, and
Sunni Kurds live in Northern Iraq. Life in Iraq: People, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in-depth/postsaddamiraq/html/3.stm (last visited
June 2, 2009).
5 PETER W. GALBRAITH, THE END OF IRAQ: How AMERICAN INCOMPETENCE
CREATED A WAR WITHOUT AN END 12 (2006); see also Peter W. Galbraith, The Case for
Dividing Iraq, TIME, Nov. 13, 2006, at 28, 28-32.
6 See Iraq Coalition Causality Count, http://icasualties.org/Iraq/index.aspx (last
visited June 2, 2009) (providing both military and civilian death statistics by month).
Some believe non-Iraqi insurgents intentionally try to spark sectarian violence through
acts such as the bombing of the Al-'Askariyya shrine. George W. Bush, President of the
United States, Press Conference at White House Conference Center Briefing Room (Aug
21, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/21/AR2006082100469.html (stating: "Secondly, it's pretty
clear-at least the evidence indicates-that the bombing of the shrine was an Al Qaida
plot, all intending to create sectarian violence.").
7 Associated Press, Violence is Down but Continues, Feb. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.kxmb.com/t/iraq/210293.asp (stating "The U.S. military says insurgent
attacks in Iraq have dropped more than 60 percent since a joint U.S-Iraq crackdown on
insurgents began a year ago this week."); see also Can a Lull be Turned into Real Peace,
THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2007, at 28.
8 See Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, 110th Cong. (Sept. 10-11, 2007)
(statement of General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq)
available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/ll0/pet091007.pdf; Joe Klein, David
Petraeus, TIME, Jan. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/article/0,28804,1690753_1695
388_1 695379,00.html; Mark Urban, Fragile Success for US Iraq Surge, BBC NEWS, Dec.
8, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/programmes/from our own correspondent/7131468.stm (last
visited June 2, 2009); see also Gordon Cucullu, The Iraq Surge: Why It's Working...,
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The next part of this note, part II, examines the Helsinki Agreement of
2007-an initial step taken by Iraqi leaders ordering negotiations to achieve
national reconciliation. In part III, this note will argue that any negotiations
resulting from the Helsinki Agreement should allow all interested parties to
partake in the negotiations. A discussion of potential consequences from
allowing all parties to participate will be provided; however, part III will
demonstrate that, in order to develop and maintain long-term peace, the
negotiations must make every attempt to include diverse voices and ideas.
Part IV of this note will discuss the role of a leader in the negotiations. The
characteristics and qualifications that the leader of such a difficult and
significant process should possess will be examined. The final part of this
note, part V, will discuss the ramifications of setting a timetable for
achieving the ultimate goals of the Helsinki Agreement.
Although all national conflicts and peace processes differ, 10 this note will
make suggestions by drawing from the positive and negative consequences
of the Northern Ireland peace process. An examination of the Northern
Ireland peace process is warranted and may be valuable because of the many
similarities between the two conflicts. Both conflicts stem from a long
history of dispute 1 with both religious and national identity overtones. 12
NEW YORK POST, Mar. 20, 2007, available at
http://www.nypost.com/seven/03202007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/why its working_
_ opedcolumnistsgordoncucullu.htm?page=0 (providing an opinion of a retired U.S.
army officer).
9 See, e.g., Ewen MacAskill, Al-Sadr Declares Ceasefire in Iraq, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 29, 2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/29/iraq.usa
(explaining Moqtada al-Sadr called for a cease fire on August 29, 2007, without
discussing any possible connection to the Helsinki Agreement).
10 George J. Mitchell, Truman Institute Peace Prize Address: Principles of Peace:
Northern Ireland and the Middle East 4 (June 8, 1999) [hereinafter Mitchell, Principles of
Peace] (explaining: "Each human being is unique. Each human society is unique. It
follows logically, then, that no two conflicts are the same. Much as we would like it,
there is no magic formula which, once discovered, can be used to end all conflicts.").
John Darby argues a peace process must include the following five criteria: "The
protagonists must be willing to negotiate in good faith; the key actors must be included in
the process; the negations must address the central issues in the dispute; force must not be
used to achieve objectives; and the negotiators must be committed to a sustained
process." JOHN DARBY, THE EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE ON PEACE PROCESSES 11 (2001).
I I The British presence in Ireland dates as far back as the Norman Invasion in 1066.
Alexander C. Linn, Note, Reconciliation of the Penitent: Sectarian Violence, Prisoner
Release, and Justice under the Good Friday Peace Accord, 26 J. LEGIS. 163, 164 (2000);
see generally CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ (2d ed. 2002) (providing a historical
account of the twentieth century in Iraq).
12 See Kathleen P. Lundy, Note, Lasting Peace in Northern Ireland. An Economic
Resolution to a Political and Religious Conflict, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
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Segregated communities resulted from the disputes in both societies, 13 and
negotiations in each society involve strong paramilitaries, radical, and
conservative groups.' 4 While each society is unique, and there are clear
differences between Northern Ireland and Iraq,' 5 an examination of an earlier
peace process will provide leaders and participants of a proposed peace
process with an understanding of tactics and principles that both succeeded
and failed in Northern Ireland.
A brief summary of the conflict in Northern Ireland is provided to
establish a cursory understanding of the comparisons that follow. 1 6 The
division of Northern Ireland into unionists17 and nationalists 18 was a source
POL'Y 699, 699-700 (2001); see also Dominic Bryan, Parading Protestants and
Consenting Catholics in Northern Ireland: Communal Conflict, Contested Public Space,
and Group Rights, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 233, 233-34 (2004); George J. Mitchell, Toward
Peace in Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1136, 1142-43 (1999) [hereinafter
Mitchell, Toward Peace]; infra Part III.A.
13 See John Hume, Address, Acceptance of Diversity: The Essence of Peace in the
North of Ireland, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1084, 1085 (1995) (stating "The horrifying
consequences of twenty-five years of violence are evident in the fact that Belfast, a city
were church-attendance rates remain very high, has thirteen walls separating unionist
communities from nationalist communities."); Lundy, supra note 12, at 712 (discussing
"peace lines," which were walls that were purposely built in Northern Ireland to separate
communities); see also Larisa Epatko, Segregated Communities in Iraq May Spell
Trouble, PBS, Feb. 12, 2008
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepthcoverage/middleeast/iraq/jan-
june08/segregation 02-12.html (last visited June 2, 2009) (discussing the problems
caused by segregated communities in Iraq).
14 See, e.g., Richard E. Neal, The Northern Ireland Peace Process, 21 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 293, 296 (1998); see also infra Part III.A.
15 In Northern Ireland, a majority of the citizens are Christian, while in Iraq a
majority are Muslim. In addition, there are foreign military forces involved in Iraq. Iraq
also has a very valuable economic asset-oil-which economically unites the country.
While there are differences between the two societies, lessons can be learned from prior
peace processes, and even though no two societies are the same, this is a legitimate
approach.
16 Knowledge of the full context of the conflict in Northern Ireland is useful for
discussing its applicability to the Iraqi negotiations for reconciliation, but an in-depth
review falls outside the scope of this note. Historical accounts include: JONATHAN
BARDON, A HISTORY OF ULSTER (1992); TIM PAT COOGAN, THE TROUBLES: IRELAND'S
ORDEAL 1966-1996 AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE (1995); and DAVID McKIrRICK &
DAVID MCVEA, MAKING SENSE OF THE TROUBLES: THE STORY OF THE CONFLICT IN
NORTHERN IRELAND (2000).
17 SALLY BELFRAGE, LIVING wiTH WAR: A BELFAST YEAR xiii (1987) (explaining
that Northern Irish conflict is essentially between predominantly Protestant unionists,
who favor Northern Ireland's continued political union with Britain, and mainly Catholic
nationalists who wish to see Northern Ireland join with the Republic of Ireland to create a
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of strife ever since the Partition of Ireland in 1920.19 A number of
unsuccessful attempts to restore peace to the province were made between
the outbreak of "The Troubles" in 196920 and the Irish Republican Army's
declaration of a ceasefire in August 1994.21 The negotiations following the
ceasefire included two governments and eight political parties, who
eventually achieved the Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast
Agreement). 22 The Good Friday Agreement was signed on April 10, 1998,23
and the people of Northern Ireland approved it on May 22, 1998.24 It
provided that Northern Ireland would remain within the United Kingdom so
long as that was the wish of the people living there; but the British and Irish
governments would give effect to arrangements for a united Ireland if a
majority vote to that effect was eventually obtained in Northern Ireland.25
The Agreement also included proposals for devolved government and,
consequently, the new Northern Ireland Assembly held elections for the first
time on June 25, 1998.26
united Ireland); see also James J. Friedberg, Ambiguity, Sovereignty, and Identity in
Ireland: Peace and Transition, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsOL. 113, 132-33 (2005); PAUL
DIXON, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE POLrrICs OF WAR AND PEACE 6-16 (2001).
18 Three separate definitions of nationalists are provided. BELFRAGE, supra note 17,
at xiii; Friedberg, supra note 17, at 132-33; DIXON, supra note 17, at 6-16.
19 See, e.g., Christopher K. Connolly, Note, Living on the Past: The Role of Truth
Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies and the Case Study of Northern Ireland, 39
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 401, 411 (2006).
20 See, e.g., id. at 412 (describing "The Troubles" as a period between the 1960s and
the 1990s in which "over 3,700 individuals died as a result of political violence in
Northern Ireland"); see generally MIKE MORRIssEY & MARIE SMYTH, NORTHERN
IRELAND AFTER THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT: VICTIMS, GRIEVANCE AND BLAME
(2002) (providing a thorough examination of "The Troubles"); see also DARBY, supra
note 10, at 17-19 (providing a brief discussion of "The Troubles").
21 See, e.g., Connolly, supra, note 19, at 412 (describing the ceasefire as a
breakthrough in the dispute); see also Brian D. Vaughan, Note, Will God Save the
Queen? Shared Authority and Sovereignty in Northern Ireland and the Case for Cross-
Border Bodies, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 511, 515-19 (2000) (discussing international efforts to
promote peace in Northern Ireland).
22 GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE 181-82 (1999) [hereinafter MITCHELL,
Making Peace].
23 DIXON, supra note 17, at 269.
24 Northern Ireland Elections, The 1998 Referendums,
http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm (last visited June 2, 2009).
25 DARBY, supra note 10, at 23; see also Friedberg, supra, note 17, at 145-47
(quoting the applicable part of the Good Friday Agreement).
26 Northern Ireland Elections, supra note 24.
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II. HELSINKI AGREEMENT-THE BEGINNING OF NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION IN IRAQ
The Helsinki Agreement2 7 has been described as a "road map" to Iraqi
peace. 28 From August 31 through September 3, 2007, sixteen representatives
of Iraqi parties and blocs29 participated in presentations, held discussions,
and "committed themselves to work towards a robust framework for a lasting
settlement. '30 Although the seminar was convened by both the Crisis
Management Initiative, overseen by former Finnish President Martti
Ahtisaari, and the John W. McCormack Graduate School of Policy Studies of
the University of Massachusetts in Boston, 31 the Iraqi representatives mainly
drew insight from senior representatives of the Northern Ireland and South
African peace processes. 32
Within the Helsinki Agreement, the representatives developed
recommendations and political objectives, agreed to consult further on the
recommendations, and agreed to start negotiations to reach national
27 Crisis Management Initiative, Helsinki Agreement, Sept. 3, 2007,
http://www.cmi.fi/files/Helsinki-agreement.English.pdf (last visited June 2, 2009).
28 Shawn Pogatchnik, Feuding Iraqi groups hold secret meeting in Finland, official
says, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 3, 2007 (quoting Jeffrey Donaldson-a Protestant
lawmaker from Northern Ireland that facilitated the discussions-calling the Helsinki
Agreement a "road map" to Iraqi peace).
29 The identity of the representatives and which parties were represented has not
been fully disclosed. According to the Crisis Management Initiative's press release
"[L]eading representatives of Iraqi political parties and others linked to a range of groups
close to the conflict" were present. Press Release, Crisis Management Initiative, Sept. 3,
2007, available at http://www.cmi.fi/?content=press&id=73 [hereinafter CAI Press
Release]. Both Sunni and Shi'ite leaders were present; however it is not clear whether
Kurdish-Sunnis were represented. It has been reported that discussions included
representatives Muqtada al-Sadr, Adnan al-Dulaimi, and Humam Hamoudi. See
Pogatchnik, supra note 28. All press releases make clear that no representatives of
occupying forces were present at the discussion.
30 CAM Press Release, supra note 29.
31 Id.
32 Leaders of the discussions included participants from the Northern Ireland peace
process: Six County Deputy First Minister and Sinn FHin Chief Negotiator, Martin
McGuinness, Sinn Fdin's Leo Green, Democratic Unionist Party Lagan Valley MP
Jeffrey Donaldson, Billy Hutchinson of the Progressive Unionist Party, and former
Stormont Assembly Speaker John Alderdice. Iraq: Helsinki Agreement Provides Hope
for the Future: McGuinness in Iraqi Peace Negotiations, AN PHOBLACHT, Sept. 6, 2007,
available at http://www.anphoblacht.com/news/detail/20563 [hereinafter McGuinness in
Iraqi Peace Negotiations]. Also present were African National Congress activist Mac
Maharaj and National Party reformer Roelf Meyer, both members of Nelson Mandela's
first unity government following the end of apartheid. Pogatchnik, supra note 28.
576
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reconciliation. 33 Some recommendations of the parties included: (1) to
resolve all political issues through non-violence and democracy, (2) to
prohibit the use of arms for all armed groups during the process of
negotiations, (3) to work to end international and regional interference in
internal Iraqi affairs, (4) to ensure the full participation of all Iraqi parties and
blocs in the political process and agreed governance arrangements, and (5)
all Iraqi parties and blocs have to build Iraq and contribute efficiently to
support all the efforts that would make the political process and Iraqi unity
successful and to preserve its sovereignty.34 The representatives also listed
nine political objectives, which included: (1) an emphasis on the continuation
of constructive dialogue between different political groups aiming to fulfill
national goals and (2) to convince political groups that are currently outside
the political process to initiate and activate a constructive dialogue to reach
common understandings. 35  The influence of the Northern Ireland
representatives is evident through the similarities of these recommendations
and objectives to provisions in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Downing
Street Agreement, and the Good Friday Agreement. 36
Beyond giving approval to principles for future negotiations and
committing to working towards a lasting solution, the Helsinki Agreement
has initiated a working relationship between Iraqi Shi'ites and Sunnis. 37
While Iraqi Sunnis and Shi'ites initially worked together to develop the Iraqi
Constitution in 2005, the withdrawal of Sunni leadership during the process
indicated difficulty in reaching consensus between the two largest political
33 CMI Press Release, supra note 29.
34 Crisis Management Initiative, supra note 27.
35 Id.
36 See Pogatchnik, supra note 28 (quoting Jeffrey Donaldson-a Protestant
lawmaker from Northern Ireland who facilitated the discussions-referring to the
similarities).
37 See id.; see also Press Release, Univ. Mass. Boston, McCormack Graduate School
Professor Leads Secret Iraq Peace Talks, Sept. 4, 2007, available at
http://www.umb.edu/news/2007news/releases/sept/peacetalks.html. Six County Deputy
First Minister and Sinn Fin Chief Negotiator, Martin McGuinness stated:
Obviously the situation in Iraq is dire at the moment but what binds these people
together is that they all consider themselves Iraqis and they all now accept that there
needs to be an inclusive process of negotiations; that this should include all of the
political forces in Iraq; it should also include the insurgents and the militia; and they
all accept that it is vital that they move forward in a united way to try to conclude an
agreement as quickly as possible.
McGuinness in Iraqi Peace Negotiations, supra note 32.
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groups in Iraq.3 8 By agreeing on political objectives and making
recommendations for national reconciliation in Iraq in the Helsinki
Agreement, the representatives were able to separate "problems from
politics";39 and so, the potential for developing consensus and achieving
peace through future negotiations is now much greater. 40
III. WHO SHOULD SIT AT THE TABLE IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS
RESULTING FROM THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT?
All Iraqi parties that are interested in a peaceful society should have the
opportunity to participate in the future negotiations called for in the Helsinki
Agreement. 41 In order to discuss who should have a seat at the table, this
section will inform the reader of the demographics, political participants, and
militia powers in Iraq. This section will also discuss the ramifications of
allowing previously violent parties into the negotiations. Further, it will
address the importance of allowing minority voices to be heard during the
negotiations. Finally, this section will discuss reasons and means to keep
parties from leaving the negotiations and reverting to violent activity.
A. The Demographics, Political Parties, and Militias in Iraq
Since Iraq is a war zone, accurate estimates of the ethnic and religious
makeup of the country are impossible.42 However, since many of the Iraqi
people have aligned into groups based on ethnicity or religion, understanding
general percentages is significant. Approximately 60%-65% of Iraqis are
Arab Shi'ites, 15%-20% are Arab Sunnis, and 15%-20% are Kurdish
Sunnis. 43  The remaining Iraqis are Turkmen, Assyrians, or other
38 Sheikh Dr. Human Hamoudi, My Perceptions on the Iraqi Constitutional Process,
59 STAN. L. REv. 1315, 1316 (2007).
39 The Helsinki Agreement announced interests or goals rather than solutions.
Consequently, parties did not have to fight over how the goals would be solved. This is
the task of future negotiations, but now the parties have centered the debate and shown an
ability to build consensus. Crisis Management Initiative, supra note 27.
40 See Jeremy A. Colby, Getting to Peace: Avoiding Roadblocks on the Path to
Peace in Northern Ireland, 14 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 1, 9-10 (2000).
41 See infra Part III.B
42 Aparisim Bobby Ghosh, The Fleeting Success of the Surge, TIME, Dec. 13, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1694441,00.html
(estimating over 2,250,000 refugees have fled to Jordan and Syria).
43 Central Intelligence Agency, THE WORLD FACTBOOK-IRAQ,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html (last visited
June 2, 2009) [hereinafter CIA World Factbook]; see also Library of Congress Country
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ethnicities.44 97% of Iraqis are Muslim, and the remaining 3% are Christians,
Yazidis, Jews, or other religions.45 Most of the political parties' memberships
are homogeneous; however, there are parties, such as the Communist Party
of Iraq and the National Foundation Congress, whose members represent
multiple religions and ethnicities.46
Though constituting the majority of the Iraqi population, historically,
Shi'ites have been underrepresented in Iraqi politics. 47 In the nineteenth
century, during Ottoman rule, Sunni Ottomans placed Sunni Arabs in
governmental positions in Iraq. 48 This practice was continued through British
policies in the early twentieth century and under Saddam Hussein's control
of Iraq.49 After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, however, Shi'ites
gained a majority of the positions of power in the new Iraqi government
through democratic elections. 50
There are multiple Shi'ite political blocs in Iraq.51 Because each of these
political parties possesses different goals pertaining to the future of Iraq, each
party must be accommodated at the negotiations. Three Shi'ite blocs have the
most influence 52 and should, therefore, be guaranteed access to the
negotiations. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIC), formerly known as
Studies, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+iq0005) (last
visited June 2, 2009).
44 CIA World Factbook-Iraq, supra note 43.
45 Id.; GlobalSecurity.Org, Religious Structures,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/religion.htm (last visited June 2, 2009)
[hereinafter GlobalSecurity, Religious Structures].
46 The Iraqi Communist Party, http://www.iraqcp.org/framsel/index.htm (last
visited June 2, 2009); Comrade Mudarisov, A History of the Iraqi Communist Party
1934-1963: Part 2, Feb. 22, 2004, http://www.soviet-
empire.com/ussr/viewtopic.php?t--28572 (last visited June 2, 2009).
47 See GlobalSecurity.Org, Shias in Iraq,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/religion-shial.htm (last visited June 2,
2009); see also Abu Khaleel, A Glimpse of Iraq: Sunni Shiite Iraq, Feb. 18, 2005,
http://glimpseofiraq.blogspot.com/2005/02/sunni-shiite-iraq.html (last visited June 2,
2009).
48 GlobalSecurity.Org, Religious Structures, supra note 45.
49 Id.
5 0 PHEBE MARR, WHO ARE IRAQ'S NEW LEADERS? WHAT Do THEY WANT?, U. S.
INST. OF PEACE, Mar. 2006, available at
http://origin.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr 60.html
51 See CIA World Factbook-Iraq, supra note 43 (listing all the political parties in
Iraq).
52 See Fast Facts: Iraqi Political Parties, Fox NEWS, Jan. 28, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,145666,00.html (last visited June 2, 2009); see
also Khaleel, supra note 47.
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the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, is led by Abdal Aziz
al Hakim. 53 The Islamic Dawa Party, a historically militant group and current
political group, is led by Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq's Prime Minister.54 These two
parties have joined to form the United Iraqi Alliance.55 The Badr Brigade,
the militant wing of the SIIC, operates mainly in southern Iraq.56 The Sadrist
Movement, led by Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, is the political wing of the
Mahdi army militia.57 Political struggle exists between these groups, and at
times, Shi'ite "militias are openly warring with each other across southern
Iraq."' 58 There is some concern that, as sectarian violence wanes, a battle may
develop between these Shi'ite blocs for control of southern Iraq, but for the
time being, there is a truce. 59
Kurdish groups, an ethnic minority in Iraq,60 must have a voice in
negotiations for national reconciliation. Most Kurdish Iraqis are Sunni and
predominantly live in northern Iraq.61 Kurds have operated under the
constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region since the mid-1990s and have
established a functional Kurdish regional government.62 There are two main
Kurdish Political parties: Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Massoud
53 See Shiite Politics in Iraq: The Role of the Supreme Council, INT'L CRISIS GROUP,
Nov. 15, 2007.
54 The Islamic Dawa Party, http://www.islamicdawaparty.com/ (follow link to
"Read more about the Party") (last visited June 2, 2009).
55 Anthony Shadid & Karl Vick, Candidate Slate Shows Shiite Closing Ranks,
WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2004, at A20, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn/A41286-2004Dec6?language=printer.
56 See All Things Considered: Profile: Opposition Group Claiming to Represent
Iraqi Shias Enters Northern Iraq (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/transcripts/2003/mar/03031 0.watson.html; see also
Lionel Beehner, Iraq"s Militia Groups, COuNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Oct. 26, 2006,
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/11824/iraqsmilitiagroups.html.
57 See Iraq"s Muqtada Al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabiliser? INT'L CRISIS GROUP, July 11,
2006; see also Patrick Jackson, Who are Iraq's Mehdi Army? BBC NEWS, May 30, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l1hi/world/middleeast/3604393.stm (last visited June 2, 2009).
58 Jonathan Finer, Book Note, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 272, 274 (2007) (reviewing
GALBRAITH, supra note 7).
59 Charles Crain, Waiting for a Shi'ite Civil War, TIME, Nov. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1683561,00.html.
60 See CIA World Factbook-Iraq, supra note 43.
61 Kurdistan - The Other Iraq, http://www.theotheriraq.com/index.html (last visited
June 2, 2009) (providing a link to download a fact sheet on Iraqi-Kurdistan).
62 Public International Law & Policy Group & The Century Foundation,
Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure in Iraq: Some Basic
Considerations, 39 NEW ENG. L. REv. 53, 57 (2003).
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Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani.63 While
these two parties have aligned as part of the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of
Kurdistan, 64 violent conflicts have erupted between the parties in the years
since U.S. occupation. 65 In the de facto independent area of Kurdistan, the
Pesh Merga is a military force independent of the Iraqi government. 66 In
addition, the Kurdistan Workers Party, a militant group, operates in Northern
Iraq. 67 Their objective is to create a socialist Kurdistan composed of
Northern Iraq, and parts of Syria, Turkey, and Iran. 68 Consequently, the
Kurdistan Workers Party does not have interest in a united democratic Iraq. 69
Sunni Arab Iraqis held a majority of the Ba'ath political positions prior
to the United States' invasion.70 Most Arab Sunnis live in central Iraq in an
area known as the Sunni triangle. 71 Urban Arab Sunnis, many former
Ba'athists, tend to be more educated and secular;72 whereas rural Arab
Sunnis often are less educated and more focused on family, clan, tribal, or
63 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, http://www.puk.org/web/htm/about/talab.html (last
visited June 2, 2009) (providing a biography of Jalal Talabani, President of Iraq); see also
Kurdistan - The Other Iraq, supra note 61.
64 See Jalal Ghazi, Palestinian Lessons for Kurdish Independence, NEW AMERICA
MEDIA, Dec. 5, 2007, available at
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view-article.html?articleid=9ed939373c3343 10
d2d52902c2868bcc (discussing the strategic move to align the two parties for Iraqi
national elections).
65 See Finer, supra note 58, at 274.
66 Kennedy, supra note 3, at 671.
67 Kurdistan Workers' Party, Federation of American Scientists, May 21, 2004,
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pkk.htm (last visited June 2, 2009).
6 8 See GlobalSecurity.Org, Kurdistan Worker's Party,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pkk.htm (last visited June 2, 2009)
[hereinafter GlobalSecurity PKK]; see also Greg Bruno, Inside the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Oct. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/14576/.
69 See Kurdistan Workers' Party, supra note 67; see also GlobalSecurity PKK, supra
note 68.
7 0 Hamza Hendawi, Sunni-Arab Minority Faces Dilemma After Saddam's Fall,
OAKLAND TRIB., Jan. 25, 2004, available at
http://fmdartices.com/p/articles/miqn4176/is_20040125/ai_n9722104 (stating that
"Sunni prestige peaked at the time of Saddam's 23-year rule.").
71 Sharon Otterman, Iraq: The Sunnis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Dec. 12,
2003, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/7678/#2.
72 Lionel Beehner, Iraq's Sunni Arabs, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Oct. 14,
2005, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9027/iraqssunni_arabs.html
[hereinafter Beehner, Iraq's Sunni Arabs].
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
regional interests.73 The main Sunni political party is the Iraqi Islamic Party,
but Sunni leadership is more fractured, and tribal leaders maintain significant
political clout.74 Some former Ba'athist Sunnis support restoring a strong,
centralized state through insurgency.75 As a result, some Iraqi Sunnis have
aligned with foreign fighters of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other insurgent
organizations. 76 AQI not only opposes U.S. presence in Iraq but also Shi'ite
leadership. 77 AQI's attacks on Iraqi citizens have since severed some of their
relationships with Sunni Iraqis.78 Sunni tribal leaders have both worked with,
and clashed with, the former Ba'athist insurgency and AQI;79 however, even
with all these divisions, most Arab Sunni Iraqis continue to support
maintaining a unified Iraq.80
Politically, Iraq is not only divided on ethnic and religious lines, but
conflict persists within the Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurdish blocs.81 Nonetheless,
a majority of Iraqis want a unified Iraq with a central government in
Baghdad.82 Almost half of the Iraqi population believes security is the
73 Id. (quoting Judith Yaphe, a senior fellow at the National Defense University,
stating that "Tribal politics is the overwhelming interest" for rural Sunnis).
74 Id.
75 See Lionel Beehner, IRAQ: Insurgency Goals, CoUNcIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
May 20, 2005, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=8117; see also Hiwa
Osman, What do the Insurgents Want? Different Visions, Same Bloody Tactics, WASH.
POST, May 8, 2005, at B 1.
76 See generally Osman, supra note 75, at BI (referring to fighters for Abu Musab
Zarqawi who was AQI's leader).
77 Karen DeYoung & Walter Pincus, Al-Qaeda in Iraq May Not Be Threat Here:
Intelligence Experts Say Group is Busy on Its Home Front, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2007,
at A20. (discussing AQI's dual objectives, but stating that its focus is fighting against
Shi'ite leadership).
78 See Peter Beaumont, Iraqi Tribes Launch Battle to Drive Al-Qaida out of
Troubled Province, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 3, 2006, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/oct/03/alqaida.iraq; see also Jim Muir, US Pits
Iraqi Sunnis Against Al-Qaeda, BBC NEWS, June 11, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6740683.stm (last visited June 2, 2009).
79 See Finer, supra note 58, at 272; see also Khaled Ali Beydoun, Comment, Dar Al-
Islam Meets "Islam as Civilization": An Alignment of Politico-Theoretical
Fundamentalisms and the Geopolitical Realism of this Worldview, 4 UCLA J. ISLAMiC &
NEAR E.L. 143, 154-56 (2004-2005)(discussing jihad and different jihadist movements);
see also Internal Violence Splits Iraqi Insurgents, NEWSMAX.COM, Nov. 12, 2005,
http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2005/11/12/115318.shtml (last visited June 2,
2009).
80 Beehner, Iraq 's Sunni Arabs, supra note 72.
81 See supra notes 43-69.
82Iraq Poll 2007, BBC & ABC News, Question 14, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/1 903 07_iraqpollnew.pdf.
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biggest problem facing their lives in Iraq today, 83 and, therefore, most Iraqis
probably desire negotiations between political groups and militias that would
result in peace and stability within the country.
B. Any Negotiations Targeting National Reconciliation Should Allow
All Interested Parties to Participate
Peace does not require a homogenous citizenship or a single mindset.84
In the mid-1990s until the decommissioning of the Irish Republican Army in
2005, Northern Ireland worked through its own peace process with a
religiously and politically divided Ulster.85 Similar to Iraq, not only were the
political parties that participated in Northern Ireland's Peace Process divided
between Protestants and Catholics, but subdivisions of the religious groups
and other minorities were also represented in the negotiations.86 Essential to
the Northern Ireland peace process was the understanding that all interested
political parties that agreed to the Mitchell Principles87 were permitted to
partake in the negotiations. 88
Any peace process that develops through negotiations called for in the
Helsinki Agreement should allow all interested parties to participate--that
83 Id. at Question 4.
84 While the Northern Ireland peace process has been the focus of this note, diverse
citizenship in South Africa and Bosnia have also worked through peace processes. For
insight into these peace processes, see KRISTINA A. BENTLEY & ROGER SOUTHALL, AN
AFRICAN PEACE PROCESS: MANDELA, SouTh AFRICA AND BuRUNDI (2005). See also
Derek Chollet & Bennett Freeman, The Secret History of Dayton: U.S. Diplomacy and
the Bosnian Peace Process 1995, The National Security Archive, Nov. 21, 2005,
available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 171/index.htm
(providing a discussion of the Bosnian Peace Process).
85 Ulster is the region where six Northern counties of Ireland were disputed since the
partition of Ireland in 1920. IrelandWilde.com, Ireland by Region: Ulster,
http://www.irelandwide.com/regional/ulster/index.htm (last visited June 2, 2009).
86 See MITCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at 23-45 (discussing the parties in
the Northern Ireland peace process. The process included representatives from the British
and Irish governments, but also included Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP),
the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Ulster
Democratic Party (UDP), United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP), Sinn F6in (the
political wing of the IRA), and the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NW). Most of
these political parties were associated with paramilitaries loosely connected to the
political party, while there were other paramilitaries that separated from the political
parties and remained autonomous).
87 The parties had to agree to democracy and a peaceful process without the use
violence or the threat of violence. Id. at 53.
88 Id.
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are Iraqi and agree to partake in a peaceful process. 89 Unless all interested
parties in this complex society are allowed to voice their concerns, then the
process will not be optimal. 90 Negotiations between some groups will
provide benefits, but to a lesser degree than if all interested parties
participated. For instance, a party that would have agreed to partake in the
negotiations, but was not included, may resort to violence to achieve its
goals, and overall peace within Iraq will not be achieved. Of course, a small
number of outsiders may have "radical" views that contradict a peaceful
process,91 but since the majority of Iraqis want a peaceful democratic
society,92 those minority voices will become isolated and easier to identify
and silence.93
89 This was the approach that Senator Mitchell used in Northern Ireland. In addition,
this is the approach called for in the eighth recommendation of the Helsinki Agreement:
"To ensure the full participation of all Iraqi parties and blocs in the political process and
agreed governance arrangements." The Helsinki Agreement's fifth political objectives
states that there should be "[a]n emphasis on the continuation of constructive dialogue
between different political groups aiming to fulfill national goals," and the eighth
political objective states that parties should be "Working towards correcting the
misunderstanding that accompanied the political process and encourage all Iraqi political
parties to participate in building Iraq in all aspects." Crisis Management Initiative, supra
note 27.
90 This is one of the reasons the sixth political objective of the Helsinki Agreement
orders those already involved "To convince political groups that are currently outside the
political process to initiate and activate a constructive dialogue to reach common
understandings." Id.; see also DARBY, supra note 10, at 119 (stating "[I]t is necessary to
apply a principle of 'sufficient inclusion' in relation to militant organizations. That is to
say, a peace process should include all actors who represent a significant proportion of
their community, as well as all actors who have the ability to destroy an agreement.");
Symposium, Whither the Peace Process? 70 TEMP. L. REv. 237, 266 (1997) (Professor
Saeb Erakat stated that "As far as the negotiations are concerned, who said that any party
can't come to the table? Of course anyone can come to the table and present whatever
they want to present. But, in order to speak [in] that peace process, you need to have
engagement in the peace process.").
91 Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 INT'L SECURITY
5, 9-11 (1997) (discussing the role of "spoilers" in peace processes. He discusses the
difference between "total spoilers" and "limited spoilers." According to Stedman, both of
these "spoilers" probably will act against the peace process.).
92 Iraq Poll 2007, supra note 82, at Questions 4, 7, 9, 14.
93 In Northern Ireland, within days of the Good Friday Agreement, the few dissident
groups announced cessation of violence. MITCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at
184; see also DARBY, supra note 10, at 119-20, 266 (discussing how to handle those that
are marginalized during the peace process and either act as "Mavericks" or "ideological
Zealots," and stating that "The more numerous and compromising the moderates, the
greater the likelihood that the extremes can be marginalized.").
584
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Other scholars may advocate against fully inclusive negotiations for
national reconciliation, arguing that the negotiations should only include the
most powerful parties in Iraq. The basic premise behind this approach is that
if the major parties in Iraq come to agreement, then those minor parties on
the outside will be influenced to join the agreement. In addition, negotiations
including a smaller number of participants will probably have less
complexity. 94 While this approach has advantages, any negotiations that are
not fully inclusive will not address all the issues permeating Iraqi society. In
addition, negotiations that only include a few parties may cause minorities to
feel that they have been neglected, causing them to rebel against the
agreement; thus true national reconciliation will not be achieved. Further,
this approach would be contrary to the eighth recommendation of the
Helsinki Agreement: "To ensure the full participation of all Iraqi parties and
blocs in the political process and agreed governance arrangements. ''95
An all-inclusive approach should even include the opportunity for
participants that may not support democracy but do support peaceful
solutions for Iraqi governance. 96 Many former Ba'athist members are against
democracy in all forms and want Shura (consultative) representation.97
Invitation to peace negotiations will allow these participants to express their
views and may influence settlement. Negotiations often involve
compromise,98 and participation may provide stepping stones for groups
opposing democracy to begin to comprehend and accept the ideals of
freedom, justice, and equality that democracy brings.99 People and groups
9 4 JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING
AND NEGOTIATION 64 (1975).
95 Crisis Management Initiative, supra note 27.
96 Although this is counterintuitive to the first and twelfth recommendation of the
Helsinki Agreement, the following argument will explain why inclusion, and at least the
opportunity to participate and reject, is important to actually achieve democracy. See
generally ANTHONY H. BIRCH, THE CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY,
105-06 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the importance of increased participation in
democracy).
97 Hamoudi, supra note 38, at 1319-20.
98 See Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of
Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 23-31 (1992) (discussing principled
bargaining theory and how compromise can be used for a win-win result).
99 Partaking in a democratic process will allow parties to experience the basic tenets
of democracy. As they see democracy function on a small scale, perhaps these leaders
will develop a better understanding of how democracy applies on a larger scale. See Luc
REYCHLER, DEMOCRATIC PEACE-BUILDING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION: THE DEVIL IS IN
THE TRANSITION 141-43 (1999); see also Tom Christiano, Democracy, Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 27, 2006, available at
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may transform through the process.' 00 In Northern Ireland, many prisoners
who had been sentenced for violent acts-often against political or religious
rivals-became some of the most ferocious advocates for the peace
process.' 0 l
Historical and economic factors also influence and support the need for
an all-party negotiation. The Iraqi Constitution states "that the oil and gas10 2
are owned by the Iraqi people and equally shared by all Iraqi individuals,
regardless of the place of extraction and production."' 0 3 The Constitution,
therefore, provides that the largest economic asset of the Iraqi people
entwines all the political groups, ethnicities, and religions. 10 4 This provision,
therefore, establishes a common ground for groups entering the peace
process, and maintenance of this universal interest supports the need for all-
party discussions.
In addition, historical examples, including the process that led to the
Helsinki Agreement, indicate Iraqi Shi'ites and Sunnis can successfully work
together.' 05 During the Iraq-Iranian War, Shi'ite Iraqis fought alongside
Sunni Iraqis against Iranians, predominately Shi'ites, in support of Iraq. 10 6
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/ (describing democracy and its effect on
liberty, equality, and public justification).
100 See generally Donna Maeda, Note, Agencies of Filipina Migrants in Globalized
Economies: Transforming International Human Rights Legal Discourse, 13 BERKELEY
LA RAZA L.J. 317, 341 (2002) (discussing immigrant labor negotiations with the power
structure).
101 See MITCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at 185-86.
102 Traditionally, the oil sector has provided about 95% of Iraq's foreign exchange
earning. CIA World Factbook-Iraq, supra note 43.
103 Hamoudi, supra note 38, at 1317; IRAQI CONST. § 4, art. 111-112, available at
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi-constitution.pdf.
104 E. Anthony Wayne, Economic and Financial Reconstruction in Iraq: Hearing
Before Senate Banking Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance, at 4, Feb. 11,
2004, available at http://merln.ndu.edu/MIERLN/PFIraq/archive/state/29288.pdf. (stating
that the oil "sector is important because production from Iraq's oil wealth provides about
95% of the country's export revenues and 95% of its government revenues.").
105 Mu Xuequan, Iraq Talks See U.S. Forces as Impediment to Peace, XINHTA
NEWS, Sept. 6, 2007, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-
09/06/content_6668624.htm (indicating that Shi'ite and Sunni leaders worked together to
draft the Helsinki Agreement).
106 GlobalSecurity.Org, Shia-Sunni Relations,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/religion-shia-sunni.htm (last visited
June 2, 2000) (stating "Nonetheless, the theory of sectarian strife was undercut by the
behavior of Iraq's Shia community during Iran's 1982 invasion and the fighting
thereafter. Although about three-quarters of the lower ranks of the army were Shias, as of
early 1988, no general insurrection of Iraqi Shias had occurred."); see also Alexander
Zavis, Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites Work Together, Distrustfully, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 2008,
586
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These historical events demonstrate that conflicting voices and interests have
previously aligned for the benefit of themselves and the Iraqi people.
Even though the negotiations should allow all parties to participate,
realistically, achievement of universal agreement on each issue will rarely
occur. Therefore, a process must be established that allows for closure of
issues without universal consensus. Previous peace processes with multiple
parties represented, including South Africa and Northern Ireland, utilized
"sufficient consensus" to arrive at agreements. 10 7 In both South Africa, a
negotiation involving twenty-six parties, and Northern Ireland, sufficient
consensus was used to "maintain a spirit of inclusiveness while avoiding the
strictures of unanimity."' 1 8 If a majority of representatives of each tradition
or faction support a proposition, even though one or more parties do not, then
the proposition has reached sufficient consensus. 109 While each process
established different rules to define "sufficient consensus," this process
allowed all interested parties to participate while empowering the major-
moderate parties in the negotiations. 10 Advocating for all-party negotiations
comes with the proviso that a mechanism such as "sufficient consensus" will
be necessary in Iraqi negotiations for national reconciliation.
The Helsinki Agreement calls for negotiations to reach national
reconciliation through non-violence and democracy,"' l which, therefore,
must allow all interested Iraqi parties to participate in order to be fully
effective. While negotiations between a smaller number of political groups
may lead to partial success, democratic ideals require full participation and
all voices to be heard. 1 2 Although a universal consensus may not be possible
to conclude a multi-party negotiation, tactics such as "sufficient consensus"
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/22/world/fg-rivalry22 (discussing Shi'ite
and Sunni forces fighting together alongside U.S. forces against insurgents).
107 Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of
Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (2003).
108 Id. at 19.
109 Conciliation Resources, Northern Ireland: Glossary, http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/northern-ireland/glossary.php (last visited June 2, 2009) (providing terms
used in Northern Ireland and stating that "sufficient consensus" is reached "if a majority
of representatives of each tradition or faction support it even though one or more parties
do not.").
110 See Mnookin, supra note 107, at 21-23.
111 In fact, this is the first recommendation of the Helsinki Agreement. Crisis
Management Initiative, supra note 27.
112 See generally Theodore Parker, Speech at N.E. Anti-Slavery Convention: The
American Idea (May 29, 1850), available at http://www.bartleby.com/100/459.html
(stating the oft quoted phrase "A democracy-that is a government of all the people, by
all the people, for all the people. ..").
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will allow many parties to participate in reaching a final agreement."13
Historical examples of multi-party political negotiations demonstrate the
effectiveness of agreements reached through all-party negotiations and the
ability to silence radical thoughts that strain the negotiations. 114 As Iraqi
leaders negotiate national reconciliation in the future, every effort should
take place to make the negotiations fully inclusive to all parties willing to
seek national reconciliation through peaceful actions.
C. Ramifications ofAllowing Previously Violent Parties to Participate
Negotiations aimed to reach national reconciliation between all interested
parties in Iraq will inevitably include parties that have employed violent
tactics in the past, both before and following the U.S. invasion of Iraq." 5
Many of the political parties in Iraq are linked to, or evolved from,
militias," 6 and allowing these parties that have used force in the past to
participate in negotiations may have ramifications. Negotiations will,
therefore, involve participants with the greatest ability to end violence, a
transition from violence to the political process may occur, and groups
possessing the most significant ethnic suspicion and mistrust may develop
effective mechanisms to overcome their suspicions. 117 On the other hand,
113 The fourth recommendation of the Helsinki Agreement states that "All parties
will commit to accept the results of the negotiations and no party can be subject to a
threat of force from any groups that reject all or part of any agreement reached." Crisis
Management Initiative, supra note 27.
14 See supra note 17 (discussing Northern Ireland); HUGH MAILL ET AL.,
CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION 174 (2d ed. 2005) (stating that "In successful
peace processes, the moderate parties come to defend the emerging agreement, and the
spoilers can even serve to consolidate a consensus in the middle ground."); see generally
CHRISTINE BELL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37-119 (2000) (discussing
peace processes in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Israel, Palestine, and Bosnia); FEN
OSLER HAMPSON, NURTURING PEACE: WHY PEACE SETTLEMENTS SUCCEED OR FAIL
(1996) (providing examples from peace processes in Cyprus, Namibia, Angola, El
Salvador, and Cambodia).
115 The seventh political objective of the Helsinki Agreement advocates for leaders
"To deal with armed groups which are not classified as terrorist, encouraging them to use
peaceful political means to address the conflict and to provide their members with jobs
and opportunities within state administrations." Crisis Management Initiative, supra note
27.
116 See supra Part III.A.
117 See, e.g., Andrew Kydd, Overcoming Mistrust, 12 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 397,
398-412 (2000) (discussing how trust can be built through strategic interaction. The
author argues that trust needs to be built through small, initial, cooperative gestures. He
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allowing previously violent groups into negotiations may validate prior
violent actions. If negotiations reach an impasse, and national reconciliation
is not achieved, this may aggravate tensions and escalate violence."i 8
If the negotiations include parties that have previously used violent
tactics and possess weapons, then those parties are naturally in the greatest
position to end violence. Either the militias or the political parties linked to
them may decommission the militias. In addition, many of these groups
represent large percentages of the Iraqi population, 1 9 and in order for
negotiations for national reconciliation to achieve significant results, these
groups must be represented. In Northern Ireland, Sinn Fdin, 120 the political
wing of the Irish Republican Army, 121 one of the more violent paranilitaries
operating in Ireland and Britain-did not participate in the beginning of the
negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement.' 22 However, Senator
Mitchell, the Chairman of the Northern Ireland Peace Process, felt that
because the process was not fully inclusive, it could not lead to a lasting
agreement until Sinn F6in joined the discussions. 123 Allowing Sinn F6in into
the discussions was one of the major stepping stones to the eventual
decommissioning of the Irish Republican Army in 2005, which had been a
major hurdle to lasting peace in Northern Ireland. 124 Thus, inclusion of a
political party linked to a violent paramilitary allowed the party to transition
from violent actions to the political process.' 25 This example illustrates the
then shows how interactions are used to overcome mistrust and facilitate cooperation in a
social dilemma game).
118 See Uppsala Universitet, Department of Peace and Conflict Research: Conflict
Database, http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bclD=227 (last visited
June 2, 2009) (arguing that many believe Fatah returned to violence in Palestine as a
consequence of failed negotiations with Israel); see also Leo F. Smyth, International
Mediation and Capitulation to the Routine, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 235, 262 (2003)
(discussing the fear amongst the public and leaders in Northern Ireland that if
negotiations did not succeed, parties would return to violence in Northern Ireland).
119 See supra Part III.A.
120 Sinn F6in was the second most supported political party by Nationalists in
Northern Ireland behind the SDLP. MITCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at 17, 29.
121 Sinn Fdin has never stated this, but it is generally accepted as the truth in
Northern Ireland. MITCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at 23.
122 See id at 110 (discussing Sinn Fin's entrance into the talks in July 1997 and the
other parties' reactions).
123 Id. at 103-05, 114 (arguing that as parties entered, "the prospects for the future
were better").
124 Id. at 114; see also Connolly, supra, note 19, at 418-19.
125 Currently Sinn Fin holds 26.2 % of the seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly
and has become the strongest nationalist political party in Northern Ireland. Ireland
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importance and practical necessity of allowing parties with violent pasts to
partake in the peace process and supports the argument that Iraqi negotiations
for national reconciliation must allow all interested parties to be involved.
Another significant aspect of allowing previously violent groups to
participate in negotiations is that some of them possess significant ethnic
suspicion and mistrust of others within the country. 126 Involvement in the
negotiations will facilitate understanding. Violent conflict generates hatred
and makes it virtually impossible for communities to trust each other. 127
Therefore, negotiations are valuable in aiding parties' establishment and
restoration of relationships. 128 By focusing on the specific parties' values and
interests, rather than abstract ideologies, dispute resolution processes help
parties understand one another's needs and values and generate solutions that
compromise the parties' varied interests. 129 This process relies on the
development of trust. 130 Becoming involved in negotiations aimed towards
national reconciliation requires that parties begin to trust and understand each
Information Guide, http://www.irelandinformationguide.com/SinnF/E9in (last visited
June 2, 2009).
126 Ghosh, supra note 3 (stating "The roots of the sectarian divide lie in a schism
that arose shortly after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century."); Mike
Shuster, The Origins of the Shia-Sunni Split, NPR, Feb. 12, 2007
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=7332087 (last visited June 2,
2009) (stating that "The violence and war [in the 7th century] split the small community
of Muslims into two branches that would never reunite." And continuing, "There were
periods of conflict and periods of peace. But the split remained and would, in the second
half of the 20th century, turn out to be one of the most important factors in the upheavals
that have ravaged the Middle East.").
127 George Mitchell stated:
At the heart of all of the problems in Northern Ireland is mistrust . . . . Each
disbelieves the other. Each assumes the worst about the other. If there is ever to be
durable peace and genuine reconciliation, what is really needed is the
decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland. That means that trust and
confidence must be built, over time, by actions in all parts of society.
MITCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at 37. For a discussion of violence in Iraq, see
supra Part III.A.
128 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
305, 325 (1971). For a more contemporary piece, see also John Paul Lederach, Exploring
the Depths of Mediation: Some Discoveries, 16 CONFLICT RESOL. NOTEs 32 (1999)
(discussing mediations-since the Helsinki Agreement calls for negotiations that can
only be achieved if parties come to agreement-these negotiations will be similar to
mediations).
129 Seamus Dunn & Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Conflict in Northern Ireland After the
Good Friday Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1372, 1379-80 (1999).
130Id. at 1379.
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other's interests by entering and partaking in the process. 13 1 Unfortunately,
for some groups this may be difficult or contrary to their ideologies, and
withdrawal from the process may occur. 132 At least this process will give
moderate voices the opportunity to understand the outlying views.
The ramifications outlined above for allowing previously violent parties
to participate in the process are positive; yet, some parties in the Northern
Ireland peace process argued that negative consequences resulted from
allowing Sinn Fin to participate. These critics asserted that granting Sinn
Fdin a seat at the table legitimized a historically violent party's previous
actions and was contrary to democracy. 133 In addition, negotiations may be
led in undesirable directions due to fear of consequences from the violent
party at the table. 134 Further, if negotiations reach an impasse, a consequence
131 Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, Resolving Conflict Together: The
Understanding-Based Model of Mediation, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 523, 524-36 (2006)
(discussing the effectiveness of an understanding-based model of mediation and the
importance of a party-oriented approach).
132 See MnTCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at 108-11 (discussing the
withdrawal and effects of the withdrawal of the UKUP and DUP in Northern Ireland
upon Sinn Fin's entry).
133 Dr. Ian P. K. Paisley, leader of the DUP, which withdrew from the Northern
Ireland peace process upon the Sinn Fin entrance, stated:
Responding to violence in this manner [allowing into negotiations] only pays
political dividends to those who are violent. Those committed to democratic means,
armed only with the power of the ballot box and the arguments for their case, cannot
achieve any momentum for their cause if they enter into dialogue, negotiations, or
dealings with those who use both politics and the bullet, bomb and balaclava.
Dr. Ian K. R. Paisley, MP, MEP, Peace Agreement-Or Last Piece in a Sellout
Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1273, 1279 (1999).
134 Dr. Paisley argued that "the political atmosphere is so putrefied by [the IRA's]
presence that the threat of violence is as potent as actual violence." Id. Dennis Kennedy, a
lecturer in European Studies at Queen's University of Belfast, eruditely explained:
What had been a search for a political accommodation between the broad
strands of nationalism and unionism became more a negotiation between militant
nationalism and the British state. The imperative of ensuring that the cease-fire was
maintained, or once broken, reinstated, dominated all other considerations, and
threatened to move matters to the plane the IRA and Sinn Fin had always been
seeking - that of a peace conference, an exercise in "conflict resolution" to end
hostilities between two sides which had been pursuing their legitimate aims
(legitimate in their own eyes) by force of arms .... The most damaging result of
this, and the one precisely desired by Republicans, has been a post-facto legitimising
of IRA terrorism. A small group long denounced by the Irish Government, moderate
nationalists and many others, as ruthless and mindless terrorists who must be
suppressed, are now dignified as essential interlocutors, without whom dialogue is
not worth a penny candle ....
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may be that violent parties resort to previous tactics with stronger aggression
and mistrust.
These arguments against including previously violent parties fail to
acknowledge that for peace processes to succeed, compromise and
innovation must take place. 135 As with Northern Ireland, there has been
violence in Iraq, and some of the groups that have acted violently in the past
potentially possess the power to bring about national reconciliation. The
pursuit of peace may require legitimizing violent groups; however, since the
overall objective of the Helsinki Agreement is to achieve national
reconciliation through peaceful means and democracy, this legitimization is
minimized because these groups must compromise their tactics according to
the principles of the Agreement. 136 Further, if these parties are not
acknowledged or allowed into the discussion, they may continue their
menacing behaviors and attempt to compromise the negotiations from the
No democrat can be happy with the large degree of appeasement of terrorism
that underlies the Agreement. The pursuit of a settlement inclusive of people long
denounced as terrorists with no place in civilized society was based on a belief that
these terrorists could not be defeated. For almost a decade now, the new consensus
has been to persuade the terrorists to move away from terrorism, to negotiate with
them, to treat them with a measure of respect, almost as honorable, if mistaken
enemies to be accommodated, not defeated. This is appeasement.
Dennis Kennedy, Dash for Agreement: Temporary Accommodation or Lasting
Settlement? 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1440, 1456-59 (1999) (quoting Square Circles, The
Cadogan Group: Round Tables and the Path to Peace in Northern Ireland §3 (1996),
http://www.cadogan.orggpubs/square.html (last visited June 2, 2009)).
135 Brian D. Vaughan stated:
[T]he desperate degree of violence and bloodshed that Ulster has witnessed since the
Troubles began in 1969 that claimed over 3,300 lives clearly calls for what some
may seem as drastic action in an attempt to bring peace to the area ... [T]he
reformers and peacemakers in Northern Ireland believe that something innovative
must be done to stem the tide of violence that has ravaged the country.
Vaughan, supra note 21, at 520.
136 Cf. Kennedy, supra note 134, at 1459. Kennedy stated:
The pursuit of peace is the highest of goals. If it can be achieved, even with a
measure of appeasement, then it is worthwhile ... It still leaves the appalling truth
that in the second half of the twentieth century a small subversive group ready to
employ ruthless terror against the civilian population cannot be defeated in a
democratic society where it commands only tiny minority support.
Id.
[Vol. 24:3 20091
NEGOTIATING PEACE IN IRAQ: LESSONS LEARNED IN NORTHERN IRELAND
outside. 137 Every effort should be made to limit the number of parties
attempting to alter the negotiations from the outside, and the best method to
reach these ends is inclusion of previously violent parties.
D. Minority Voices Must be Allowed to Participate in the Negotiations
The preamble to the Iraqi Constitution grants "an equal opportunity for
all"'138 by providing "a republican, federal, democratic, pluralistic system."' 139
Further, the Iraqi Constitution guarantees that all shall be free from
discrimination based on "gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, origin, color,
religion, sect, belief, or opinion."' 140 Specifically relating to gender, the
Constitution attempts to affirm that Iraq will encourage and ensure gender
equality.' 4 ' Nonetheless, since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, many minorities
have not experienced the political guarantees they expected. 142 "[T]he ability
137 Mitchell, Principles of Peace, supra note 10, at 5 (stating that "A second need is
for clear and determined policy not to yield to those willing to use violence. Over and
over, they tried to destroy the peace process in Northern Ireland; at times they nearly
succeeded.").
138 IRAQI CONST. pmbl., available at
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi-constitution.pdf.
139 Id
140Id at art. 14.
141 Vanessa J. Jimenez explained that:
The Constitution .... ensures that all Iraqis "are equal before the law without
discrimination based on gender" (art. 14); guarantees that both male and female
citizens have equal rights "to participate in public affairs and to enjoy political
rights" (art. 20); prohibits domestic violence (art. 29); and provides for an electoral
law that aims to achieve not less than 25 percent representation of women in the
Council of Representatives (art. 47).
Vanessa J. Jimenez, Iraq's Constitutional Process: Challenges and the Road Ahead, 13
HuM. RTS. BRIEF 21, 23 (2005).
142 See Who is Kissing the Women of Basra, MADRE, Jan. 9, 2008,
http://www.madre.org/index.php?s=4&news=71 (last visited June 2, 2009) (stating that
"shifting the focus from culture to gender reveals a system of power that is nearly
universal. Yanar Mohammed, the founder of OWFI [Organization of Women's Freedom
in Iraq], describes this year's killings of women in Basra as a campaign 'to restrain
women into the domestic domain and end all female participation in the social and
political scene."'); see also Nadje Sadig Al-Ali, Iraq's Women Under Pressure, LE
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, May 2007, available at
http://mondediplo.com/2007/05/05iraqwomen (documenting the change since the ouster
of Sadaam Hussein's regime). Additionally, National Public Radio's All Things
Considered has reported:
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of Iraqi leaders to forge a peaceful future will depend on the manner in which
the government ensures that the unique identities, values, and concerns of its
diverse ethnic, religious, and national minorities are respected and given a
voice in the governance of the country."' 143
Negotiations for national reconciliation must include representatives of
gender, ethnic, and religious minorities. Opportunities to partake in
negotiations will politically strengthen minorities internally. 44 They also
may promote majoritarian understanding of minorities, and future power
sharing amongst minorities and majorities, as the Iraqi government
evolves. 145 In Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition
("NIWC") participated in negotiations that led to the Good Friday
Agreement. 146 Senator Mitchell explained:
The women overcame a great deal of adversity. Early in the process [the
NIWC] were not taken seriously in our peace talks and they were insulted in
the Forum .... [I]t took many months for their courage and commitment to
earn the attention and respect of the other parties. In the final stages of the
Years of violence there have affected everyone, young and old, soldiers and civilians
alike. But the lives of women have perhaps been affected the most. Their right to go
and do what they wish has been dramatically restricted by the rise of Islamist parties
and extremist groups. In the last six months human rights groups report that more
than 100 women have been killed in the city of Basra alone. Their crime? Wearing
make-up or what is considered Western clothing. And many who dare to defend
them have also been attacked or killed.
All Things Considered: Iraqi Women Face Greater Danger, Fewer Rights (NPR radio
broadcast, Jan. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=l 8518858.
143 Jimenez, supra note 141, at 22-23 (noting that the Iraqi Constitution met this
objective through recognition of freedom of religion, the protection of various minority
rights, and a federal system that allowed for local self-governance and the equitable
distribution of natural resource revenues).
144 See Kate Fearon & Monica McWilliams, The Good Friday Agreement: A
Triumph of Substance over Style, 22 FORDAM INT'L L.J. 1250, 1255 (1999) (stating that
in the wake of the ceasefires in Northern Ireland, "Several consultative conferences were
convened, creating the space for women involved in these networks and groups to come
together and to give voice to their aspirations for the community as a whole, and to try to
find ways in which these aspirations could be impressed on decision-makers.").
145 See generally Christine Chinkin, Gender, Human Rights, and Peace Agreements,
18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 867, 871-73 (2003) (discussing the importance of
including minorities, the benefits that develop due to including minorities--especially
women-in peace processes, and the failures of previous processes. Chinkin highlights
the fact that participation can change perceptions of other stakeholders).
146 Fearon & McWilliams, supra note 144, at 1255-56 (detailing experiences of the
NIWC in the negotiations and expresses their opinions regarding the ramifications of the
NIWC in the future of Northern Ireland).
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negotiations they were serious, important participants, and were treated as
such. 147
Ostensibly, if the NIWC had not been allowed to participate in the
negotiations, many of the benefits Northern Irish women gained, by having
other participants observe the NIWC's devotion and propositions, would
never have come to fruition. 148 Although minority voices may not "win"
under a "sufficient consensus" voting procedure, inclusion in the process
should at least enhance other parties' understandings of their beliefs and
commitment to peace.
Iraq is a very diverse nation. 149 National reconciliation relies on all
groups having a voice represented at negotiations. 150 The impact of the
NIWC in the Northern Ireland peace process indicates one such success
stemming from minority participation. Groups such as the Iraqi Women
Network, 151 Kurdish leadership, Assyrian leadership, as well as many other
minorities, must be allowed to participate. The Iraqi Women Network's
organizational makeup, which already includes members from both Shi'ite
and Sunni religious groups working together, may provide a stepping stone
for overall national reconciliation. 152 Participation by minority groups would
allow them to solidify their own internal interests, but it would also
encourage national reconciliation by allowing a more diverse group of voices
to participate and contribute their interests and devotion to the process.
E. The Importance of Preventing Parties from Leaving Negotiations
and Reengaging in Violent Actions
Undoubtedly, negotiations for national reconciliation between past
violent groups and representatives from the diverse makeup of Iraq, each
possessing different interests, will encounter roadblocks and controversies
that may encourage some leaders to take the "easy" choice and exit the
147 MITCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at 44.
148 Id. at 44; see Fearon & McWilliams, supra note 144, at 1258-61.
149 See supra Part III.A.
150 See supra Part III.B.
151 Iraqi Women Network, Iraqi Women Network Conference: Commemorating
Pioneer Women and Present Challenges for the Iraqi, Jan. 7, 2008,
http://www.resistingwomen.net/spip.php?article280 (last visited June 2, 2009)
(discussing the composition of the Iraqi Women Network).
152 See id.
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negotiations. 153 Both the leader of the negotiations and other leaders
representing groups within the negotiations should make strong efforts to
prevent parties from leaving negotiations, which would essentially end the
fully-inclusive process. Withdrawal by parties from the national
reconciliation process will denigrate the achievement of the negotiations, by
not being fully inclusive, and also, withdrawing parties may attempt to
damage the negotiations during and after agreement by resorting to past
violent behaviors that fuel hostilities. 154 Participants should discourage
withdrawal, but avoid compromising solely due to fears that parties may
withdraw and reengage in their violent tactics if they do not obtain their
desires through the peaceful process. 155
Insight gained from analyzing the Northern Ireland peace process
indicates the problems created and benefits gained when disgruntled parties
withdraw from the process. Upon Sinn Fdin's entrance into the bargaining
table, both the DUP and UKUP withdrew. 156 According to Senator Mitchell,
David Trimble, the leader of the largest unionist party remaining at the table,
experienced daily attacks from leaders who withdrew, accusing him of
selling out the union.157 However, "[i]t was the fear, the anxiety, which
gnawed away at every soul' 1 58 that allowed Trimble to have the support of
his party, which allowed the process to continue and to finally reach
agreement. 1 9 According to Mitchell, "reaching agreement without their [the
DUP and UKUP] presence was difficult; it would have been impossible with
them in the room." 160 Although these statements suggest that allowing
153 See Mitchell, Principles of Peace, supra note 10, at 6 (acknowledging that
leaders dislike risk and that a tough part of leading negotiations is having parties take
risks, which are necessary for compromise).
154 See e.g., DARBY, supra note 10, at 50-61 (discussing a return to political
violence, tactical violence, spoiler violence by "Zealots", and policy implications due to
return of violence).
155 See id. at 58-61.
156 MITCHELL Making Peace, supra note 22, at 110-11.
157 Id. at 173.
158 Id. at 174.
159 Id. at 174-75.
160 Id. at 110. George Mitchell argued that their stonewalling would have never
yielded peace because they were unwilling to compromise. However, he did not
acknowledge that many of the other parties that seemed to be "set in stone" did
eventually compromise. Senator Mitchell continued:
In a last-ditch effort to block an agreement, Ian Paisley led a few hundred of his
supporters onto the grounds at Stormont. Angry at being denied entrance, they broke
through a gate and surged up the hill to a monument to the legendary unionist leader
Edward Cason .... They called Trimble a traitor and denounced the talks .... As
596
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parties to withdraw has benefits, if the goal is complete national
reconciliation, the leaders must still make attempts to maintain all parties'
involvement.
Those outside the discussions may target the negotiations during the
process and after agreement is reached by the remaining parties. For
example, Senator Mitchell explained that many outside parties attempted to
end the Northern Ireland peace process through violence. 161 While the
Helsinki Agreement calls for resolving all political issues through non-
violence and democracy, 162 those who leave the negotiations will not need to
abide by those tenets. In Iraq, a country torn apart by violent actions such as
mosque bombings, assassinations, and suicide bombings of civilians, the fear
of withdrawal and escalation of violence is real. 163 A time may come when a
party's cooperation and inability to negotiate in good faith makes them an
adversary to the whole process, but until leaders at the negotiation come to
this absolute conclusion, they should discourage withdrawal. Compromise
and understanding will come to each group at a different pace, 164 and
inability to move should not be viewed as an absolute violation of good faith
negotiating. 165
he tried to make a statement he was interrupted by loud, rude heckling. Some
members of the loyalist party, once among the most fervent of his supporters,
savagely accused him of running away .... He was the ghost of a violent past, now
they wanted peace.
Id. at 177.
161 Mitchell, Principles of Peace, supra note 10, at 5 (describing the bombing in
Omagh that killed twenty-nine people and arguing that atrocities such as this one were
aimed at escalating sectarian violence and ending the peace process).
162 Crisis Management Initiative, supra note 27.
163 Dahr Jamail, Mirage of Improvement in Iraq: Yet Another Facelifi for the Failed
Occupation, ISLAM ONLINE, Dec. 10, 2007,
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article C&cid=l 196786126550&pagena
me=Zone-English-MuslimAffairs%2FMAELayout (last visited June 2, 2009) (arguing
that recent success comparisons to immediate post-war statistics are misleading. He
indicates that violence and the possibility of an escalation of violence are present in Iraq
today).
164 See Peter Guyon Earle, Note, The Impasse Doctrine, 64 CuE-KENT L. REV. 407,
420 (1988) (discussing how the length of negotiations relates to the possibility of
impasse).
165 See generally Kimberlee Kovach, Lawyer Ethics in Mediation: Time for a
Requirement of Good Faith in Mediation, 4 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 9, 11 (Winter 1997)
(although discussing mediation, Kovach stated "good faith relates to the manner of
participation rather than its content . . . . Good faith does not imply that parties are
required to resolve their disputes, and certainly should not be used to coerce the parties to
settle the matter on any particular economic basis.").
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Withdrawal may make negotiating difficult because withdrawing parties
may resort to past tactics, but the withdrawing parties may also pose
additional challenges in implementing any of the agreements reached through
negotiations for national reconciliation. Parties that withdraw may feel that
any agreement reached is contrary to their principles and beliefs and,
therefore, may attempt to stymie any implementation of the proposals. 166 The
DUP and UKUP attempted this approach following the Good Friday
Agreement and, consequently, their efforts were one of the reasons that
reaching agreement was not the end of conflicts in Northern Ireland. 167 The
negotiating parties must be interested in effective implementation following
agreement, and the concern that withdrawing parties will attempt to block
implementation should encourage participating parties to discourage
withdrawal of those involved in the negotiations for national reconciliation.
The Helsinki Agreement has potentially set the wheels in motion towards
national reconciliation in Iraq.168 Any future negotiations should allow all
interested parties from Iraq to participate in the discussions. 169 Although
tactics such as "sufficient consensus" and splitting parties into different
rooms may be used, the talks should allow all voices to be heard if true
national reconciliation is to be reached.170 It may be inevitable that some
parties attempt to withdraw as compromises are made and risks taken, but
those leading the discussions should strive to keep parties from withdrawing
so that the discussions remain fully inclusive. 171 Iraq is going through
166 Vaughan, supra note 21, at 516 ("The crux of the unionist opposition was based
on the fact that their leadership had not been included in the discussion and agreement to
the plan.").
167 Id. at 533 (stating "Those opposed to the agreement used every opportunity to
delay implementation process.").
168 McGuinness in Iraqi Peace Negotiations, supra note 32 (stating that
"participants committed themselves to work towards a robust framework for a lasting
settlement.").
169 See supra Part III.B.
170 See supra Part Ill.B; see also George J. Mitchell, Jackson H. Ralston Lecture:
Negotiating for Peace in Northern Ireland, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 163, 166 (2001). George
Mitchell stated that:
[N]ot for a single moment, was I able to get all the parties into the same room at the
same time. Never once did all of them sit down together. Most of the negotiations
were conducted in what has come to be known as a proximity basis: one group in
one room, another group in another room, often in separate buildings. I shuttled back
and forth between them.
Id.
171 DARBY, supra note 10, at 58 (stating "The key policy objective, therefore, is to
ensure that [Dealers] remain in the process.").
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dramatic times, and processes such as a negotiation for national
reconciliation may be one of the best tactics to cure misunderstanding and
lead to a peaceful democracy.
IV. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE LEADER(S) IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
All forms of alternative dispute resolution utilize a leader that aids the
process, and some of these processes even allow or mandate the leader to
make a final binding decision. 172 There are some qualities that all effective
leaders should possess; however, the role of the leader and the process used
may prioritize certain qualities and qualifications over others. 173 This section
will discuss fundamental characteristics or qualifications a leader should
possess, the character traits that allowed Senator Mitchell and his leadership
group to succeed in Northern Ireland, and characteristics of leaders in
existing alternative dispute resolution processes in Muslim culture.
Ultimately, a neutral, foreign facilitator instead of a biased, local evaluator
should lead negotiations for national reconciliation in Iraq.
A. Fundamental Characteristics or Qualifications of an Effective
Leader of Negotiations for National Reconciliation in Iraq
The leader of negotiations for national reconciliation in Iraq will
essentially assume the role of a mediator because the Helsinki Agreement
does not call for the leader of the talks to make a binding decision. 174
American scholars have argued over an appropriate role of a mediator for at
least the last forty years. 175 Nonetheless, there is wide agreement that the
172 American Arbitration Association, Arbitraion and Mediation,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28749 (last visited June 2, 2009) (providing a basic
definition for mediation and arbitration and illustrating the distinction between a
decisionmaker and a facilitator).
173 See generally Report of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
(SPIDR) Commission on Qualifications, Dispute Resolution Forum (Washington D.C.
1989), in JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 402-04 (2d ed.
2006) (providing insight into what qualifications an arbitrator or mediator should have for
different types of disputes).
174 The fourth recommendation of the Helsinki Agreement provides: "All parties
will commit to accept the results of the negotiations and no party can be subject to a
threat of force from any groups that reject all or part of any agreement reached." Crisis
Management Initiative, supra note 27.
175 See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 7, 23-38 (1996)
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mediator must possess qualities necessary for inspiring confidence and trust
amongst the participants. 176 Therefore, it is essential that leaders be
intelligent, patient, and active listeners. 177 After looking at the example set in
Northern Ireland, characteristics of dispute resolution inherent in Islamic
culture, and the magnitude of parties advocated for in an all-party resolution
process, an impartial outsider will be the most reasonable person to chair the
process. Strict impartiality of the leader, advocated for in the Model
Standards of Conduct For Mediators,178 is essential to the integrity of the
whole process, prevents predicaments occurring due to favoritism, and
allows the process to be party-oriented. 179
B. Leadership Qualities and Characteristics in the Northern Ireland
Peace Process
Senator Mitchell, the chairman of the Northern Ireland peace process,
has set an example of the type of qualifications a leader of a national peace
process should embody in order to promote, develop, and effectively
conclude the peace process.180 Above all, the leader should believe that there
is "no such thing as a conflict that can't be ended," and they should believe,
"No matter how ancient the conflict, no matter how hateful, no matter how
hurtful, peace can prevail.' 181 Stubborn but realistic optimism is essential to
(discussing Evaluative/Facilitative and Broad/Narrow approaches); see also Donald T.
Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-And of Mediator Activism, 33
WILLAMETrE L. REv. 501, 527-60 (1997) (discussing mediator activism).
176 John D. Feerick, The Peace-Making Role of a Mediator, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 229, 231 (2003).
177 See id.; see also HOWARD GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS: THE ART AND SCIENCE
OF CHANGING OUR OWN AND OTHER PEOPLE'S MINDS 108-12 (2006) (arguing that the
hallmarks of the effective leader are intelligence, instinct, and integrity).
178 "A mediator shall decline a mediation if the mediator cannot conduct it in an
impartial manner. Impartiality means freedom from favoritism, bias or prejudice."
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS 4 (Am. Bar Ass'n, Am. Arb. Ass'n,
Ass'n for Conflict Resol., Aug. 2005) available at
htpp://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfmal05.pdf.
179 See Association for Conflict Resolution, Model Standards for Conduct of
Mediators 1994 (AAA, ABA, SPIDR),
http://www.acmet.org/about/initiatives/QualityAssurance/standards-conduct.htm (last
visited June 2, 2009) (commenting on what is meant by impartiality in Section II and
stating that the overall "quality of the mediation process is enhanced when the parties
have confidence in the impartiality of the mediator.").
180 Feerick, supra note 176, at 238 (reasoning that "[t]he manner in which Senator
Mitchell conducted himself throughout the talks made its success possible.").
181 Mitchell, Principles of Peace, supra note 10, at 5.
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an effective leader because despair and pessimism surround discussions
between parties that have used violent tactics in the past.182
Patience, devotion, perseverance, sensitivity, innovativeness, and
experience are all characteristics Senator Mitchell possessed that allowed
him to be an effective leader of the Northern Ireland peace process. 8 3
Patience is needed because incremental movements may occur very slowly
during discussions for national reconciliation. 184 Senator Mitchell's devotion
and perseverance allowed him to successfully lead as outsiders attempted to
end ceasefires, roadblocks occurred, parties withdrew, and his own personal
life suffered tragedies. 185 Mitchell's sensitivity to the parties and their
allegiances, to their cultural customs, and to the process itself were all keys
182 See id. at 5 (discussing how people thought he was wasting his time and conflict
could never be ended because of the centuries of killing that doomed the region. Senator
Mitchell believed in order for leaders to do their job and lead, they must create an
"attitude of success, the belief that things can be better. Not in a foolish or unrealistic
way, but in a way that creates hope and confidence among the people.").
183 See generally, Feerick, supra note 176, 238-4 1.
184 Senator Mitchell described the pace of negotiations when he asserted:
For hundreds and hundreds of hours I had listened to the same arguments, over
and over again. Very little had been accomplished. It had taken two months to get an
understanding on the rules to be followed once the negotiations began. Then it took
another two months to get agreement on a preliminary agenda. Then we had tried for
fourteen more months to get an accord on a detailed final agenda .... I bit my lip,
squirmed in my seat, and worked hard not to let my anger show.
MITCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at 126. UUP Deputy Leader John Taylor said
Senator Mitchell "has shown great ability and tremendous patience and tolerance from
the word go." Id. at 69.
185 Senator Mitchell vividly exclaimed:
Sometimes the mountains seem so high and the rivers so wide that it is hard to
continue the journey. But no matter how bleak the outlook, the search for peace
must go on.
Seeking an end to conflict is not for the timid or the tentative. It takes courage,
perseverance, and steady nerves in the face of violence.
Mitchell, Toward Peace, supra note 12, at 1140; see also MITCHELL, Making Peace,
supra note 22, at 65-69, 74-75 (discussing the passing of his brother Robbie and his
decision to stay at the talks for two days because of the potential for progress, which in
his mind led to the stakeholders growing acceptance of him. Mitchell also discussed his
wife Heather's loss of a child during her pregnancy, and how the both of them still
justified his continuing to lead in the Northern Ireland peace process); Feerick, supra note
176, at 238 (discussing Senator Mitchell's perseverance).
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to his effective leadership. 186 In addition, Mitchell's experience as the
majority leader in the United States' Senate provided him with experience
necessary for understanding trade-offs, communication, and effective
listening. 187
C. Dispute Resolution and Characteristics of Dispute Resolution
Leaders in Muslim Culture
Iraq is predominantly a Muslim country, 188 and there is a long-standing
tradition in Islamic culture that encourages resolution of disputes between
Muslims peacefully. 189 The process resulting in sulh--compromise,
settlement, or agreement between disputing parties-in Islam "end[s] conflict
and hostility among believers so that they may conduct their relationships in
peace and amity."' 190 Sulh is a legally binding form of contract, and its
purpose seems consistent with the Western concept of alternative dispute
resolution. 191 "Under Islamic law, ADR and the court systems are essentially
mixed, but, historically, the court systems have relied on the concept of sulh
to dispense justice more efficiently than court-ordered mediation in Western
systems." 192
A qadi (Islamic judge) helps disputing parties reach sulh.193 During
Ottoman rule, "Qadis preferred reconciliation between the parties instead of
186 See Feerick, supra note 176, at 236-37 (discussing the importance of symbols,
such as what locations would be the venues for the talks that would take place and his
decisions on how many people should be at each discussion).
187 See MITCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at ix, 5. Mitchell also noted that
his political experience taught him "the importance of having a plan and sticking to it
while retaining the flexibility to make adjustments as circumstances change; the necessity
of total commitment; and the need for patience and perseverance to overcome inevitable
setbacks." Id. at 8.
188 See Religious Structures, supra note 45.
189 See Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Conflict Resolution in an Islamic Context: Some
Conceptual Questions, 21 PEACE & CHANGE 22, 23 (1996) (acknowledging that dispute
resolution procedures "have been applied to settle interpersonal, community, and inter-
religious disputes in Islamic societies for hundreds of years.").
190 Walid Iqbal, Courts Lawyering, and ADR: Glimpses into the Islamic Tradition,
28 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1035, 1035 (2001) (mentioning that this would typically involve
alternative dispute resolution procedures).
191 Joshua F. Berry, Note, The Trouble We Have with the Iraqis Is US: A Proposal
for Alternative Dispute Resolution in the New Iraq, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 487,
502 (2005).
192 Id. at 502 (citing Iqbal, supra note 190, at 1035-36).
193 See Iqbal, supra note 190, at 1036-39. A definition of the qadi is:
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enforcement of a judgment."'194 The process of mediation helped settle many
cases, and "the parties reached sulh on 'mutually acceptable terms and
surrendered all rights to further claim on the matter.' 195 The qadi courts had
a noticeable difference from formal courts for being simple and informal by
using minimal procedural intricacies.' 96
Mediation allows parties to avoid public confrontation in a courtroom,
and this fact is very important in the Muslim culture, "which places a high
value on honor, dignity, and self-respect."' 197 While Americans are often
concerned with mediation procedures that assure fairness, neutrality, and a
process that leads to an acceptable solution, generally, Muslims are instead
concerned with honor and dignity.198 A mediator in Muslim culture often "is
someone who can help resolve the conflict while maintaining honor and
group harmony,"'199 and sometimes committees are chosen to lead the
mediations. 200 Consequently, Muslims often want a mediator or leader that
they know either personally or through reputation and respect.201
Judge in Islam, whose responsibility is restricted to issues connected to religion. A
qadi must be a man educated in Islamic science, and his performance must be totally
congruent with Sharia without using his own interpretation .... A qadi must not
receive gifts from participants in a trial and he must be careful in engaging himself
in trade .... The origin of the institution of qadi, is the old Arab arbitrator, the
hakam, but qualities from officials in areas conquered by Arabs have been added to
the structure.
Tore Kjeilen, Qadi, LOOKLEX ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://looklex.com/e.o/qadi.htm (last
visited June 2, 2009).
194 Berry, supra note 191, at 503 (citing Iqbal, supra note 190, at 1037).
195 Id. (quoting Iqbal, supra note 190, at 1037).
196 See Iqbal, supra note 190, at 1038-42 (discussing self-representation, the fact
that confrontation of the defendant by the plaintiff, the use of oaths, and the presence of
reliable witnesses were indispensable to the process, but also that the courts were simple,
personal, and unbiased).
197 See Berry, supra note 191, at 511-12.
198 Id. at 512.
199 Id.
2 00 Id. 516-19.
201 See George E. Irani, Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts, 3
MIDDLE EAST R. INT'L AFF. 1, 5 (1999), available at
http://meria.idc.ac.il/joumal/1999/issue2/irani.pdf (explaining that in Arab culture "the
mediator is perceived as someone having all the answers and solutions . . . . 'If [the
mediator] does not provide the answers, he or she is not really respected or considered to
be legitimate."').
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D. Impartiality and Recommended Leaders of the National
Reconciliation Process Called for in the Helsinki Agreement
The diversity and number of participants in a process for national
reconciliation, the magnitude of the process, and prior complaints of
favoritism 20 2 all support a need for an impartial leader in the negotiations for
national reconciliation in Iraq. Although this may be contrary to some of the
customs of the Muslim participants, impartiality will be essential to the
fairness and effectiveness of the process. 20 3 In addition, the leaders of the
negotiations should take a facilitative rather than evaluative approach.204
The violent cross-cultural conflict in Iraq has estranged communities and
increased misunderstandings; 205 it also involves groups with competing goals
and interests.20 6 An independent third party without a vested interest in the
outcome is in the best position to facilitate the discussions.207 Of course, the
leader must make strong efforts to gain an understanding of the culture,
traditions, people, and issues involved in the process for national
reconciliation. 20 8 Although some may argue that this is just another outsider
becoming involved in Iraq, to date, no Iraqi leader has stepped forward and
202 See Hamoudi, supra note 38, at 1316 (discussing the "charge" of
"nonparticipation of the Sunnis" in the Iraqi constitutional process).
203 See Feerick, supra note 176, at 229 (stating that a great mediator must adhere to
"strict impartiality" throughout the process); Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail:
An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OMO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
235, 248 (1993) (arguing that "To the extent that a neutral third party is trusted by both
sides, the neutral may be able to induce the parties to reveal information about their
underlying interests, needs, priorities, and aspirations that they would not disclose to their
adversary.").
204 Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937, 937-48 (1997) (arguing that while arbitrators, judges, and
neutral experts evaluate, mediators should assist the parties in coming to their own
decisions).
205 See supra Part III.A.
206 See supra Part III.A.
207 "Each side [in Northern Ireland] is normally suspicious of 'outsiders' and
especially suspicious of those who spend time with the opposition .... There are very
few, if any truly neutral people .... While we need not to feign neutrality, we do...
need to remain impartial . . . . Impartiality is an important hallmark of a mediator."
Brendan McAllister, Mediation: A Tool for Change-Northern Ireland Experience, 18
CONFLICT RESOL. NOTEs, 28, 28-29 (2001). McAllister later described impartiality as
"open-minded." Id.; see also Feerick, supra note 176, at 241 (discussing the importance
of impartial mediators, but emphasizing the need to become familiar with the diverse
backgrounds' of all the parties involved).
208 See Feerick, supra note 176, at 241.
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demonstrated enough universal appeal to gain the trust and cooperation of all
interested parties.
Some scholars do not support a foreign, neutral leader of discussions,
advocating instead for mediators with similar regional identities to the parties
involved because they believe these leaders have stronger incentives to
improve their own regional stability. 20 9 However, the different factions
within Iraq may anticipate biases in an Iranian, Turkish, or Saudi Arabian
leader who they will likely perceive as an advocate for people of the leader's
own ethnicity or religion.210 Therefore, animosity may develop instead of
trust between the leader of the discussions and the parties involved.211 In
addition, due to globalization, the instability of Iraq has an impact on
individuals around the world, 2 12 and so everyone has a stake in lasting peace
in Iraq.
Others argue for a balanced team of leaders composed of individuals
who each share personal characteristics with one of the disputing parties. 213
These scholars believe this leadership mechanism for mediation increases the
leaders' credibility due to their implied genuineness. 214 However, the
previously outlined characteristics of a strong leader should allow an
impartial, third party to develop trust through their own genuineness without
209 See Marie Olson & Frederic S. Pearson, Civil War Characteristics, Mediators,
and Resolution, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 421, 421-45 (2002).
210 A recent estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency provides that 89% of
Iranians are Shi'ite. Central Intellegence Agency, THE WORLD FACTBOOK-IRAN,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html (last visited
June 2, 2009). The majority of Saudi Arabians are Sunni. U.S. Department of State, Saudi
Arabia: International Freedom Religious Report (2004),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35507.htm (last visited June 2, 2009). And,
Turkey has recently withdrawn troops from Iraq after fighting against Kurdish rebels.
Iraq Incursion Finished, Turkey Says, CNN, Feb. 29, 2008,
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/02/29/iraq.main/index.html (last visited June
2, 2009); see also Iraq Poll 2007, supra note 82, at Question 38 (showing a majority of
Iraqis believe Syrians, Iranians, and Saudi Arabians are actively engaged in encouraging
sectarian violence in Iraq).
211 See McAllister, supra note 207, at 28-29.
212 William Scheuerman, Globalization, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/globalization/ (last visited June 2, 2009) (defining
globalization as "fundamental changes in the spatial and temporal contours of social
existence, according to which the significance of space or territory undergoes shifts in the
face of a no less dramatic acceleration in the temporal structure of crucial forms of
human activity.").
213 See Feerick, supra note 176, at 244-45 (discussing Herbert Kelman's Program
on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) at Harvard University).
214Id
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running as large a risk of bias and favoritism. In addition, leaders tied to
individual groups may instigate clashes between leadership, rather than a
unified approach to leadership.
Leaders from Northern Ireland, including Jeffrey Donaldson, 215 Padraig
O'Malley,216  Billy Hutchinson,2 17  John Alderdice,218  and Martin
McGuiness, 219 leaders from South Africa including Mac Mahara 220 and
Roelf Meyer,221 and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, 222 having already
begun to develop a relationship with the sixteen delegates who drafted the
Helsinki Agreement, 223 may potentially be strong leaders of the negotiations
for national reconciliation. There may be concerns that those related to the
British government possess a conflict of interest with the fifth
recommendation to the Helsinki Agreement: "To work to end international
and regional interference in internal Iraqi affairs." 224 There also may be
concerns that new parties will not have the same relationship as those who
already have accomplished the Helsinki Agreement with these leaders. This
fear should be mitigated by these leaders' experiences and the fact that the
prior meetings only lasted four days. Since the leaders who led the process
that promoted the creation of the Helsinki Agreement appear neutral and
possess experience, as well as many of the other desired qualities of
successful leaders, they should continue leading the negotiations for national
reconciliation in Iraq.
215 Jeffrey Donaldson-About Me, http://www.jeffreydonaldson.org/AboutMe.asp





Heart of Hope" hyperlink; then follow "A Gatherer of Minds" hyperlink; then follow
"Biography O'Malley" hyperlink) (last visited June 2, 2009).
217 Billy Hutchinson, Biography, http://www.pup-
ni.org.uk/people/billyhutchinson.aspx (last visited June 2, 2009).
218 Lord Alderdice, http://www.libdems.org.uk/?link=people.html (follow "peers"
hyperlink; then follow "Lord Alderdice" hyperlink) (last visited June 2, 2009).
219 Mid Ulster-Martin McGuiness, http://sinnfein.ie/elections/candidate/3 (last
visited June 2, 2009).
220 Biography of Mac Maharaj, http://www.anc.org.za/people/maharaj.html (last
visited June 2, 2009).
221 Roelof Petrus (Roelf) Meyer, Curriculum Vitae, available at
www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/SouthAfrica/satpaxcdrom/files/CV%20Meyer.pdf.
222 President Martti Ahtisaari, Curriculum Vitae, available at
http://www.cmi.fL/?content=-cvboard&id=l.
223 See McGuinness in Iraqi Peace Negotiations, supra note 32.
224 Crisis Management Initiative, supra note 27.
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V. SETTING A DEADLINE-WOULD A LEADER WANT TO EMPLOY THIS
TACTIC AT THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS?
Although negotiations for national reconciliation of Iraq are in their
nascent stages, this section will discuss whether or not a leader should set a
deadline for concluding the discussions with an agreement or solution at the
outset of the process. Leaders of the negotiations for national reconciliation
should determine this strategic option prior to commencing any discussions
with the interested parties. While this section will discuss whether or not a
leader should set a deadline at the beginning of the process, 225 potentially,
the leaders will never set a deadline, and agreement may be reached without
ever employing this tactic.
"Deadlines define the limits regarding the period of time in which
agreement must be reached. ' 226 Deadlines are often effective because they
imply negative consequences if the parties fail to achieve an agreement by
the agreed upon settlement date.227 Scholars argue deadlines may have a
stimulating effect on negotiations because of the "scarcity effect," which
"refers to our human tendency to want things more when we think the supply
is running out."'228 Essentially, the "scarcity effect" implies a leader's
imposition of a deadline on the negotiations can motivate parties to engage
and act in their negotiations because they feel that time is running out on a
valuable opportunity.229
Senator Mitchell successfully moved up the deadline during the Northern
Ireland peace process to Good Friday.230 Although a deadline had been set at
the beginning of the process, 231 Senator Mitchell decided an earlier date
225 Sometimes deadlines will need to be ratified by the interested parties. See
Feerick, supra note 176, at 237.
226 Alain B. Burresse, Negotiation Theory & Practice: Deadlines, 31 MONT.
LAWYER 22, 22 (April 2006).
227 Id. at 22-23.
228 G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES
FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 180 (1999).
229 1d; see also Craig A. McEwan & Roselle L. Wissler, Finding Out If It Is True:
Comparing Mediation and Negotiation Through Research, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 131, 136
(2002) (arguing that "Depending on how it is structured, mandated mediation could keep
the process moving by setting deadlines and creating a negotiation event that induces
clients and lawyers to focus seriously on the case."); Burresse, supra note 227, at 23
(contending that "without a deadline, or at least the perception of a deadline, there is little
inducement for taking action, much less for accommodation and compromise.").
230 Feerick, supra note 176, at 237.
231 Senator Mitchell noted that the legislation that established the legal basis
established a deadline of May 1998 and, during the talks, Prime Minister Tony Blair once
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would promote action.232 He "concluded that a deadline for negotiations was
necessary if there was to be any chance of success" and that "existence of a
deadline couldn't guarantee success-but it made it possible." 233 His
decision was based on a belief that the parties would fail to decide anything
because final decisions encompassed so much risk and danger, and it was
easier to just continue to talk and discuss possibilities. 234 Another element
influencing his decision was that events outside the negotiations were
beginning to escalate, and one polarizing violent act outside the negotiations
could potentially dissolve any camaraderie developed between the parties
causing the negotiations to either stall or implode.235 Senator Mitchell's
decision to move the deadline successfully encouraged all the parties to
devote themselves to non-stop negotiations, which led to the Good Friday
Agreement and, in Mitchell's opinion, prevented failure. 236
Although setting a deadline at the beginning of negotiations for national
reconciliation may stimulate the parties, a deadline also bears potentially
negative consequences. One danger is that an agreement may not be
accomplished by the deadline. Naturally, if this occurs, there are two
potential results: negotiations end without agreement, or negotiations
continue without observing the deadline. While the former result would
obviously disappoint the parties, the latter outcome would devalue the
positive attributes of a future, more realistic, deadline.237 Therefore, leaders
of negotiations for national reconciliation should first determine a realistic
timetable, and only after they gain an understanding of the complexities of
the negotiations should they establish a deadline (if they believe a deadline is
necessary).
Setting deadlines early in the process may have other negative
consequences. A deadline may encourage parties to play "chicken." 238 The
consequence of this game, in which each party delays making concessions
until the deadline is imminent, is that either one party gives in, rather than
achieving compromise, or else none of the parties make concessions, forcing
tried to invigorate the process by calling attention to the existing deadline and pledging to
enforce it. MITCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at 103.
232 Id. at 126.
233 Mitchell, Principles of Peace, supra note 10, at 3.
234 Id.
235 MITCHELL, Making Peace, supra note 22, at 126.
236 Mitchell, Principles of Peace, supra note 10, at 3; see also Feerick, supra note
176, at 237.
237 See Burresse, supra note 227, at 23.
2 3 8 Id.
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all parties to endure consequences that they most likely do not desire.239
Further, "a fixed deadline may not offer the best foundation for a permanent
or even long-term settlement, particularly if principles are forgotten in the
process" 240 because parties may insert ambiguous provisions into the
agreement or just consent to a symbolic agreement.241 Leaders may likewise
ignore contentious issues or principles in order to allow an agreement to be
reached by the predetermined deadline.242 Pressure may potentially
encourage parties to cave and agree to terms that they will not adhere to after
removing themselves from the process and analyzing the effects of the
agreement. One final negative consequence of setting an early deadline is
that parties will not be able to solidify their viewpoints, and the more
empowered, organized parties, therefore, will be more successful in
achieving agreements that benefit their followings, rather than Iraq as a
whole. 243
While many Iraqis are interested in swift negotiations with the potential
of developing national reconciliation in Iraq, a peaceful Iraq, and the
departure of occupying forces, 244 leaders of the negotiations should not
establish a deadline until assessing the complexities of the negotiations.
Deadlines are an effective tool in negotiations because they apply pressures
upon the parties. However, the discussed consequences are severe, and a
leader should have a thorough understanding of the process and the pace of
the negotiations before using this strategic tool. While leaders should be
aware of the effects of deadlines at the beginning of the negotiations, a
thorough assessment of the parties, their values, the complexities, and the
desired agreement should occur before leaders establish a deadline. This
should allow for a strong agreement to be reached rather than an ambiguous,
symbolic one.
239 Id.
240 Kennedy, supra note 134, at 1461.
241 Id. at 1461-62 (arguing that the Northern Ireland peace process resulted in
agreements that did not answer all the essential questions, such as what is meant by
"separate but equal," and that a hard-pressed negotiator that is desperate for an agreement
will seize upon ambiguities that parties are willing to agree upon).
242 Id. at 1462.
243 See KEVIN AVRUCH, CULTURE & CONFLICT RESOLUTION 48-55 (1998). Avruch
states that "the idea that truly weaker parties can be empowered inside the workshop
space is unproven." Id. at 51; see generally DEAN G. PRUITT & PETER J. CARNEVALE,
NEGOTIATION IN SOCIAL CONFLICT 130-32 (1993) (discussing the roles of power and
relative power in negotiations).
244 Iraq Poll 2007, supra note 82, at Questions 4, 14, 19.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Iraq has a long history of disputes between its political, religious, and
ethnic parties. 245 Following the invasion and occupation of Iraq by foreign
forces,246 Iraqis drafted and passed a new constitution, held national
elections, and begun a new era of governance. 247 Nonetheless, conflict still
permeates daily life in Iraq,248 and blocs within Iraq have not achieved
national reconciliation. In late-August and early-September of 2007, Iraqi
leaders began the process of negotiations for national reconciliation by
signing the Helsinki Agreement. 249 The promising Helsinki Agreement
provides recommendations for negotiations for national reconciliation and
political objectives, but it does not address all the logistical issues relating to
the process.250
This note addressed which parties should be included in the negotiations
for national reconciliation in Iraq,251 characteristics of leaders of the
negotiations, 252 and whether a deadline should be established at the outset of
the negotiations.253 For many reasons, including the potential for a long-
lasting agreement, the negotiations for national reconciliation in Iraq should
be fully-inclusive. 254 Leaders with experience in conflict resolution initiated
the discussions that led to the Helsinki Agreement, and the relationships that
they developed will lay a foundation for a successful process; therefore, they
should lead future negotiations.255 Further, since these leaders have not had a
sufficient amount of time and exposure to the parties and complexities of the
process, they should not currently establish a deadline for the negotiations to
245 See supra Part III.A.
246 See generally GORDON & TRAINER, supra note 1.
247 Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, CRS Report
for Congress (August 2, 2005), available at
http://price.house.gov/issues/uploadedfiles/foreign4.pdf (Mr. Katzman is a specialist in
Middle Eastern Affairs in the Congressional Research Office's Foreign Affairs, Defense,
and Trade Division.
248 See Iraq Poll, supra note 82.
249 CMI Press Release, supra note 29.
250 Crisis Management Initiative, supra note 27.
251 See supra Part III.B.
252 See supra Part IV.
253 See supra Part V.
254 See supra Part I.B.
255 See supra Part IV.D.
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conclude-although they may eventually determine a deadline is
necessary. 256
Inclusion, leadership, and deadlines are just three of the many logistical
issues that the leaders of the negotiations for national reconciliation must
address in order to lead a successful process. These leaders have many other
logistical issues they will need to resolve prior to opening negotiations. For
example, the location(s) of the negotiations must be determined, the role of
the press must be addressed, and prioritization of interests must be
established. The leaders must determine whether holding discussions in one
grand room with all parties or dividing into subgroups will be more effective.
In addition, the leaders and parties must always analyze whether a separate
alternative exists that will more effectively achieve national reconciliation.
These are just some of the issues that must be analyzed to control a
successful dispute resolution process.
Iraqi leaders have already begun the process towards national
reconciliation in Iraq by drafting the Helsinki Agreement. Drawing ideas
from the Northern Irish and South African leaders over four days in the fall
of 2007, these Iraqi leaders have begun to appreciate prior peace processes.
As negotiations continue, leaders of different Iraqi blocs, and leaders of the
negotiations, should continue to study the success of earlier peace processes
in order to gain a better understanding of how peace is created.257
Approaching this process in Iraq as passionately as those involved in the
Northern Ireland peace process may one day allow Iraqi leaders to utter
words similar to Tony Blair's when he stated, "Look back and we see
centuries marked by conflict, hardship, even hatred among the people of
these islands. Look forward and we see the chance to shake off those heavy
chains of history. '258
256 See supra Part V.
257 As Dorothy Thompson once said after her journalistic experience during the
Second World War, "Peace has to be created, in order to be maintained. It is the product
of Faith, Strength, Energy, Will, Sympathy, Justice, Imagination, and the triumph of
principle. It will never be achieved by passivity and quietism." Dorothy Thompson
Quotes, http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/DorothyThompson/ (last visited June 2,
2009).
258 Owen Bowcott, A Laugh and a Look into the Future as Old Foes Join Forces at
Last to Share Power at Stormont, THE GUARDIAN, May 9, 2007, at 4, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/may/09/uk.northemirelandl (quoting Tony Blair
paying tribute to his predecessor, Sir John Major, for initiating the peace process).
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